Introduction
In this chapter we treat stationary strategies and the limiting average criterion. Generally, for the average reward criterion, players need historydependent strategies in playing nearly optimal or in equilibrium. A behavioral strategy may condition its choice of mixed action, at any given stage, on the entire history; and therefore its implementation is often a huge task. However, a stationary strategy conditions its choice of mixed action, at any given state, only on the present state. Since only as many decision rules as states need be remembered, a stationary strategy is preferable. In addition, ε-optimal stationary strategies are also ε-optimal in the model of the game where the players observe at every stage only the current state. These observation make it useful to know in which situations ε-optimal stationary strategies exist. This viewpoint is the main topic of this chapter.
Two-person zero-sum stochastic games with the limiting average criterion were introduced by Gillette [6] . He considered games with perfect information and irreducible stochastic games. For both classes both players possess average optimal stationary strategies. Blackwell and Ferguson [3] introduced the big match which showed that for limiting average stochastic games the value does not need to exist within the class of stationary strategies, and this result shows that history-dependent strategies are indispensable. Hoffman and Karp [7] considered irreducible stochastic games and gave an algorithm that yields ε-optimal stationary strategies. Starting with the paper of Parthasarathy and Raghavan [9] , during the eighties several papers on special classes of stochastic games appeared. These classes were defined by conditions on the reward and/or transition structure. These classes were defined on the one hand to represent practical situations and on the other hand to derive classes of games for which the solution is relatively easy, i.e., in terms of stationary strategies. In this spirit we just mention the papers of Parthasarathy et al. [10] and Vrieze et al. [14] . Finally, we mention the paper of Filar et al. [4] , which examines from the computational viewpoint the possibilities of stationary strategies.
The chapter is built up around a limit theorem that connects limits of discounted rewards to average rewards when the discount factor tends to 0. This limit theorem turns out to be quite powerful, since many theorems concerning stationary strategies can now easily be proved. Among them are irreducible stochastic games and existence questions concerning (ε-)easy states. We end the chapter with some considerations regarding the relation between Puisseux series and existence of optimal stationary strategies for the limiting average criterion and the total reward criterion.
Stationary Strategies
In this section we consider stationary strategies. It will turn out that for stationary strategies the rewards for the different criteria can be written in a closed form and therefore stationary strategies are relatively easy to analyze.
Let us recall that a stationary strategy, say for player 1, was defined by a
for all z ∈ S, is a probability vector in the IR mz . The obvious implementation of such a strategy is that whenever the state of the system is in state z, player 1 will choose action a with probability α(z, a), a = 1, . . . , m z . Here m z denotes the number of actions of player 1 in state z.
For player 2 a stationary strategy is denoted by β = (β(1), β(2), . . . , β(t)) where β(z) =(β(z, 1),β(z, 2), . . .,β(z, n z )) for all z ∈ S and where β(z) is a probability vector in the IR n z . The implementation of such a β is analogous to the implementation of α.
Now we investigate what will happen when the players implement the combination (α, β). Associated to (α, β) are a matrix P (α, β) and a vector r(α, β), which can be defined as follows:
First observe that p(z |z, α, β) and r(z, α, β) only depend on α(z) and β(z). Next, by definition it follows that p(z |z, α, β) is the expected probability that the system moves in one step to state z whenever the system is in state z and the players play according to α and β. Likewise, r(z, α, β) denotes the expected payoff in state z.
Lemma 1 Let P n (α, β) := P (α, β)(P n−1 (α, β)) with n = 1, 2, . . ., and where P 0 (α, β) := I. Then p n (z |z, α, β), being the (z, z )-th element of P n (α, β), equals the probability that the system is in state z after n steps, when the starting state was state z.
Proof. By induction. For n = 1 the lemma is true by definition. Suppose the lemma is true for n − 1. Observe that by definition
Given the induction hypothesis this expression denotes the sum of the probabilities of all the trajectories from z to z , where in the first step the system moves from state z to z and in the next n − 1 steps from z to z . Hence the lemma is true for n, which completes the proof. Now that we know the probabilities on the future states, the future expected payoffs can be expressed straightforwardly. First observe that in the z-th row of P n (α, β) we find the n-step probabilities for the game that starts in state z. Then, the z-th component of the vector
denotes the expected payoff at stage n when the starting state was z and (α, β) were implemented. For the different criteria the expressions for the overall expected payoff follow easily:
Discounted rewards:
Average rewards:
Total rewards in case of finiteness:
Weighted rewards, δ ∈ [0, 1]:
Some comments might be in order.
For later use, it easily follows that
(iii) For the total rewards the expression
denotes the average of the first N partial sums of expected payoffs, while γ T (α, β) is the limit of these numbers. That we use this definition for the total rewards and not simply lim
other things, by the following zero-sum example:
for N even and (0,0) for N odd. Hence the limit does not exist, while γ T (α, β) as defined above equals ( Whenever the average reward is unequal to 0 the total reward will be +∞ or −∞ depending on the sign of the average reward. When the average reward for a pair of stationary strategies equals 0 we have a nice expression for γ T (α, β) as given above, and which is proved in the next lemma.
Proof. In the proof we suppress the dependency of the variables on α and β.
Repeatedly iterating this last equation shows that
and after averaging:
Taking limits we get
(iv) The weighted reward is a convex combination of the discounted reward and the average reward. It can be interpreted as a balance between long-run incentives (the average reward) and short-sighted income (the discounted reward).
A LIMIT THEOREM
If we rearrange the states then the stochastic matrix P (α, β) can be written as
For each l ∈ {1, . . . , L} , P l (α, β) is a square matrix and the states corresponding to this matrix form an ergodic class. We suppose that the Markov chain has L ergodic classes.
The remaining states, corresponding to the bottom block, are the transient states.
The Cesaro limit Q(α, β) has a similar shape:
In any textbook on Markov chains the following lemma can be found.
has identical rows, say q l (α, β), and q l (α, β) is the unique probability vector that satisfies the equation
The solution set of the equation q T P (α, β) = q T , where q is required to be a probability vector, consists of the set Now we are going to prove our limit theorem. 
Then we see that T (I −P (α, β)) = 0. Hence each row of T is an invariant distribution with respect to P (α, β), as in (v) of the previous lemma. But then for suitable ξ zl :
As a consequence of this limit theorem we can formulate the following theorem, which can first be found in Schweitzer [11] .
. Suppose that the ergodic classes corresponding to P (α, β) are the same as those of
Proof. The proof needs some work and will not be given in detail here. By realizing that
and that (P n (α λn , β λn ))(z, z ) = 0 whenever z ∈ ergodic class l and z / ∈ ergodic class l, it follows that ξ z l = 0 for z ∈ ergodic class l and l = l. Hence ξ zl = 1 and the theorem is correct for the recurrent states. That the theorem is correct for the transient states as well follows from continuity arguments.
Unichain Stochastic Games
Unichain stochastic games are defined as games where for each pair of stationary strategies there is exactly one ergodic class. Notice that transient states are allowed. A special case of the class of unichain stochastic games is the irreducible games where the one ergodic class consists of the whole state space.
For unichain stochastic games the main existence theorems can be derived straightforwardly by considering the limit process of discounted games when λ n goes to 0.
The next lemma is an easy consequence of the limit theorem of the previous section.
Lemma 4 Consider a unichain stochastic game. Let
The proof of the next theorem is now immediate.
Theorem 3 Consider a unichain stochastic game. Let
where α λ n and β λ n are optimal for the players for the λ n -discounted reward stochastic game. Then α and β are optimal for the average reward stochastic game.
Proof. Let α λn and β λn be λ n -discounted optimal. Then
Which shows that the value of the average reward game equals γ(α, β) and that α and β are optimal. In fact, in this last conclusion we used the fact that a best response of a player to a stationary strategy of the other player can be found among his stationary strategies (Hordijk et al. [8] ).
The next non-zero-sum version of the previous theorem can be proved along the same lines.
Theorem 4 Consider a unichain stochastic game. Let
where (α λn ,β λn ) is an equilibrium point with respect to the λ n -discounted reward stochastic game. Then (α, β) is an equilibrium point with respect to the average reward criterion.
Obviously, since Q(α, β) has identical rows, it follows that γ(α, β) has identical components. So any starting state gives the same future prospects. This insight can be used in the analysis of the weighted reward stochastic game. We can state the following theorem. Proof. Let α λ be discounted optimal and α be average optimal. Consider the strategy σ(N ) which is defined as playing α λ at the first N stages and playing α thereafter. It can easily be checked that, for any ε > 0, σ(N ) guarantees δγ λ + (1 − δ)γ up to ε when N is large enough.
In general, optimal strategies will not exist for weighted reward games. The previous theorem can in an obvious way be extended to non-zero-sum weighted reward unichain stochastic games, by combining a λ-discounted equilibrium pair (α λ ,β λ ) with an average equilibrium pair (α, β).
EASY INITIAL STATES
For average reward stochastic games generally optimal or nearly optimal stationary strategies will not exist. This raises the question whether there are starting states such that a player can guarantee the value for these starting states, using stationary strategies. This question can be answered positively, again using the limit theory. A state is called (ε-)easy for a player if the player can guarantee the value for this game (up to ε) using stationary strategies.
Theorem 6 Let S max be the subset of states for which γ, the average reward value, is maximal and let S min be the subset of state for which γ is minimal.
(i) The states S max are ε-easy for player 2 and some of the states of S max are easy for player 1.
(ii) The states S min are ε-easy for player 1 and some of the states of S min are easy for player 2.
Proof. We show (i). Let α λn be λ n -discounted optimal and let α = lim n→∞ α λn while lim n→∞ λ n = 0. Let β be an average reward best response to α. Then γ λ n (α λ n , β) ≥ γ λ n and by the limit theorem we derive Let β λ be λ-discounted optimal. For all α we derive from
which yields after multiplication by Q(αβ λ ) that
Since γ λ − γ ≤ ε, for λ close enough to 0 and since the row sums of Q(α,β λ ) equal 1, we find γ(z, α,β λ ) ≤ max z γ(z) − ε, for λ close enough to 0. Hence β λ is ε-optimal for the states z ∈ S max .
The following example, due to Thuijsman [12] , shows that not all states in S max need to be easy. We close this section with the observation that if S max = S min = S (so the average value is independent of the initial state), then, for both players, λ-discounted optimal stationary strategies are average ε-optimal as well.
For obvious reasons stochastic games for which the players possess (ε-) optimal stationary strategies are favorable from a practical viewpoint. It would be advantageous to determine the (ε-) easy states of a game. However, we know of no algorithm that specifies the (ε-)easy states. Finally, without proof, we give a set of functional equations; the existence of a solution to it is equivalent to the existence of optimal stationary strategies for both players. can be taken for all λ ∈ (0, λ). Hence the above set of equations reduces to
which, by the linearity in λ has a power series as general solution. We deduce that for Markov decision problems the above Puisseux series can be reduced to a power series of the type ∞ k=0 c k λ k . This result can be used in proving the next theorem. We will not prove this theorem rigorously, but indicate how the abovementioned result for M DP 's can be used. Let α be average reward optimal for player 1 and consider the minimizing M DP that results for player 2 when he gets to know α in advance of the play. For M DP (α) we know by the above result that
Likewise, for a stationary strategy β that is average reward optimal for player 2, we find that
A stationary strategy is called uniform discount optimal if it is discount optimal for all λ close enough to 0. Using the limit theorem it follows that a uniform discount optimal strategy is average optimal as well. The following theorem characterizes uniform discount optimal stationary strategies. 
for all λ close to 0.
Proof. The proof follows straightforwardly from discounted stochastic game considerations.
TOTAL REWARD GAMES AND PUISSEUX SERIES
The total reward criterion makes sense only when the average reward value equals 0 for each initial state. But this condition is not enough. If a player, say player 1, possesses no average optimal strategy, then obviously player 1 cannot guarantee himself anything more than −∞ in the total reward game. Hence we make the additional assumption that both players possess average reward optimal stationary strategies.
The next theorem can be found in Filar and Vrieze [5] . In the previous section we proved that c 1 = c 2 = · · · = c M = 0 whenever both players possess optimal stationary strategies. A similar statement holds for the total reward games.
Theorem 11
When for a total reward stochastic game, for which the average reward is 0 and both players possess average reward optimal stationary strategies, both players have total reward optimal stationary strategies, then
The proof of this theorem is quite similar to the analogous theorem for the average reward case.
In fact, the total reward criterion should be considered as a refinement in addition to the average reward criterion. This can best be seen from the following two examples: For both games the average reward value equals 0 while the total reward value equals (1,-1), respectively (1,-1,0 ).
The refinement procedure on top of the average reward criterion we gave here could be repeated in the next levels. For instance, the next extension leads to a criterion which has as value c 2M , etc.
